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I. INTRODUCTION
Several books have been written recently on the collapse of the banking
industry in the United States. These books are enlightening to the extent
they detail the economic problems facing the industry and propose construc-
tive solutions for resolving the crisis. Unfortunately, the books fail to pro-
vide a convincing account of the cause of the current problems in the
banking industry. Ultimately, the problems facing the American banking
industry are political, not economic. Thus, solving the banking crisis will
require meaningful change in the underlying political environment. While
these books adequately explain how a rational regulatory system would deal
with our current problems, they fail to explain why such a system does not
exist.
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II. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS:
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
Two obstacles must be overcome before meaningful reform of the bank-
ing industry can take place. First, the political impediments blocking reform
efforts must be removed. Although many commentators agree that politics
inhibits reform, no one has offered a satisfactory explanation of why mean-
ingful reform has yet to occur. The political system has, over time, managed
to generate substantial regulatory change in areas such as civil rights and the
environment. The banking crisis is singular in its inability to spark meaning-
ful reform.
The second obstacle to reform stems from lack of understanding about
the economic underpinnings of the banking crisis. Banks fail for the same
reasons other firms fail. In a competitive economy, firms fail for one of two
reasons: Either they are inefficient or they are obsolete. An inefficient firm
fails because it is unable to supply services or products at competitive prices.
An obsolete firm fails because consumer demand is too low to generate a
price that is sufficiently high to cover the firm's average cost of production.
Any meaningful reform proposal must recognize and address the ineluctable
fact that the latter problem, and not the former, plagues the banking
industry.
Contrary to popular belief, U.S. banks are failing in record numbers not
because they are run by incompetent or inefficient management, but because
they offer an antiquated, obsolete package of goods and services to consum-
ers who have an ever-increasing array of superior, low-cost substitutes from
which to choose. Unfortunately, there are severe political costs to politicians
and regulators who attempt to deal with the industry's obsolescence.
A. Political Impediments to Reform
Historically, the banking industry was a heavily regulated, highly pro-
tected cartel' that reflected a simple political deal: In exchange for their
willingness to be used in ways convenient to politicians, banks would earn
the monopoly profits enjoyed by cartels. The problem with cartels is that
they generally contain the seeds of their own destruction. Their super-com-
petitive profits attract new entrants which compete away the economic rents
previously earned by members of the cartel. In banking, the entrants were
financial institutions like insurance companies, investment banks, pension
funds, and credit unions that legally could compete with commercial banks
but did not have to comply with the costly regulations restricting banks'
activities. Because banks deal in the most fungible of all commodities-
money-no amount of political clout was sufficient to bar entry by these new
competitors because new technology had made it increasingly easy to evade
existing regulation:
Developments in computer and communications technology have reduced
1. See Bryan, p. 12.
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the economic role of commercial banks .... These permanent and funda-
mental changes in the environment for conducting financial business cannot
be halted by statutory prohibitions, and the longer the law refuses to recog-
nize that fundamental and permanent changes have occurred, the less rele-
vant it will be as a force for stability and competitive fairness in our financial
markets. Attempts to hold the present structure in place will be defeated
through the inevitable loopholes that innovation forced by competitive ne-
cessity will develop ....
The significance of these technological developments is that the key role
of banks as financial intermediaries has been undermined. 2
But the disappearance of the abnormal returns once earned by banks has not
led to the abolition of the competitive restrictions imposed upon the banking
industry for the past sixty years. The banking industry resists change--or
pursues change only half-heartedly-because those segments of the banking
industry that could not compete in a reformed regulatory environment con-
tinue to voice strong opposition to change.
Thus, despite the fact that the banking industry is not earning monopoly
profits due to relentless expansion (both through new entry and through in-
ternal expansion),3 there is still strong internal opposition to reforming the
banking industry. As a consequence, the banking industry faces the costs
associated with a regulatory structure prohibiting it from engaging in many
profitable ventures, without the concomitant benefits associated with mem-
bership in a properly functioning cartel.
In addition to intra-industry opposition, the behavior of politicians and
the government bureaucracy that regulates banks and thrifts also has a de-
structive influence on banking reform. We can best illustrate this fact with
three examples. The first example concerns the lack of attention given to the
issue by the 1992 presidential candidates. Despite the fact that the collapse
of the banking industry and the impending bankruptcy of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) are the most severe economic problems
confronting the nation, both parties' candidates ignored the issue almost en-
tirely.4 This is exactly what happened in 1988 when George Bush and
Michael Dukakis appeared to have reached an implicit understanding to ig-
nore the savings and loan crisis until after the election. Candidates for
elected office realize that meaningful reform has political consequences, and
neither party is willing to face those consequences by seriously advocating
reform.
Second, every major political scandal in the United States since Water-
gate has had some connection to the banking industry. The list of politicians
tainted by their association with the industry is not short. For example,
former Representative Tony Coelho of California and former House Speaker
2. Alan Greenspan, Statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
US. Senate (Dec. 1, 1987), 74 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 91, 93 (1988).
3. See Bryan, pp. 55-60 (discussing internal expansion).
4. See, ag., Jim McTague, Why You Won't Hear Candidates Talk of Banking, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 26, 1992, at 1.
November 1992]
HeinOnline -- 45 Stan. L. Rev. 291 1992-1993
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
Jim Wright of Texas were both forced out of office, in large part, because of
their unethical dealings with banks.5 While the Senators who comprised the
Keating Five survived their brush with the Senate Ethics Committee, their
careers were permanently tarnished by their association with the scandal.6
On the Republican side, Neil Bush's problems at Silverado clearly did not
help George Bush's efforts to disassociate his party from the banking mess.7
From a purely political standpoint, any reform oriented politician first must
overcome an immediate credibility problem as a result of both parties' past
involvement in highly publicized scandals.
The final, most telling, indication of the current crisis' political underpin-
nings is the increased politicization of the bureaucracy regulating banks and
thrifts. As regulatory agencies become more responsive to popular opinion,
the regulatory process becomes more guided by political expediency than by
economic reality." This result can be illustrated by the actons of M. Danny
Wall, who, as chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, systemati-
cally understated the magnitude of the savings and loan crisis,9 and by the
misguided early resolution program proposed by T. Timothy Ryan, the di-
rector of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), in February, 1992.10
Other political impediments to reform are a result of societal disinterest
in the banking crisis. Some of this apathy is a direct result of policies and
programs implemented by the government. The deposit insurance system is
the primary culprit. Despite the fact that a substantial portion of most peo-
ple's disposable wealth is tied up in bank demand deposits, most depositors
have no incentive to galvanize into an effective political coalition to bring
banks under a rational regulatory scheme. As we have pointed out in an-
other context, prior to the implementation of deposit insurance, depositors
gained protection for their investments by requiring banks to operate under
a system of double liability. This system called for receivers of failed banks
to determine the extent of the insolvency and then assess shareholders for an
amount up to the par value of their stock.11 Under the current regime, de-
positors and financial markets have no incentive to demand this sort of pri-
vate sector protection. In other words, deposit insurance
deprives insured depositors of any incentive at all to press for constructive
change in banking regulation. Banks can lobby for unsafe, anticompetitive
5. Robert Sherrill, The Looting Decade." S & Ls Big Banks and Other Triumphs of Capitalism,
THE NATION, Nov. 19, 1990, at 589, 602-03.
6. Jerry Roberts, How Big Risks Lead to Scandal for Lincoln S & L, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 19,
1989, at Al.
7. Michael Isikoff, As Race Heats Up, So Does Scrutiny of Bush's Family; Relatives' Business
Affairs Become Target, WAsH. PoST, July 4, 1992, at Al.
8. See generally Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of.American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REv. 10, 32-53 (1991) (citing fragmentation of the financial industry in the United States as an
example of the political forces shaping the regulatory process).
9. David R. Sands, Wall resigns as S & L Regulator, cites 'a corruption of the truth,' WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1989, at Al.
10. Rep. Gonzalez Criticises S & L Plan, STAR TRIaB., Feb. 26, 1992, at 3D.
11. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders" His-
tory and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 31 (1992).
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regulations without fear that consumer groups will challenge the regulations
on the ground that they endanger the interests of depositors. The fact that
depositors are insured thus deprives the regulatory process of a much
needed voice, which, in the absence of such insurance, would fervently press
for regulations that protected depositors' interests. 12
Even if government-sponsored deposit insurance were removed, the
banking crisis would nonetheless receive little public attention. The general
public has less incentive to participate in the political process on banking
issues because banking is perceived (probably correctly) as being both more
complex and more boring than many other public policy issues. Therefore,
unlike environmental or civil rights issues, people derive less ideological sat-
isfaction from political participation geared towards reforming the financial
services industry. 13 As a consequence, unlike many other regulatory agen-
cies, "banking agencies are not going to find themselves confronted with an
array of consumer groups when they are called upon to make policy as it
relates to bank risk." 14 Since the public interest is not likely to be expressed
in any coherent way, banking policy will not be particularly responsive to
the public interest.
Likewise, the fact that banking is more complex than other issues of pub-
lic policy (such as abortion and school prayer) makes banking regulation
particularly susceptible to domination by special interest groups. The com-
plexity of the bank regulatory structure raises the cost to the general public
of becoming informed and knowledgeable about bank regulation and reform.
Broadly speaking, it is irrational for members of the general public to obtain
information about issues concerning bank reform due to the high costs of
obtaining such information and the low probability that such information
can be used to affect legislative outcomes. 15 But for banks and other special
interests, it is cost effective to master the complex issues of bank regulation.
These groups have a direct economic stake in such issues, and, as a by-
product of their ordinary business operations, bank regulation provides the
information they need about regulatory initiatives. 16 Moreover, even if the
general public is able to galvanize into an effective political coalition for the
purpose of influencing banking legislation, once such legislation is passed,
special interest groups will be relentless in their efforts to influence the day-
to-day implementation of regulations. 17
In sum, because of the combination of multi-industry activity by power-
ful interest groups associated with regulation, the lack of public concern or
oversight due to the complex and boring nature of banking regulation, and
the protection afforded by federal deposit insurance, the usual problems as-
12. Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science ofRegulating Bank Risk 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1277,
1284 (1989).
13. Id. at 1287.
14. Id. at 1288.
15. Id. at 1289.
16. Id.
17. See Dwight R. Lee, Politics Ideology and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 191,
197(1988).
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sociated with regulation (particularly those of special interest group domina-
tion of the law-making process) are magnified dramatically in the context of
banking regulation. The current political process creates perverse economic
incentives leading to inappropriate regulation of the banking industry. Until
the political process can be brought under control, the U.S. banking industry
will continue to deteriorate, and the domestic economy will continue to de-
cline. Unfortunately, while meaningful reform of the banking industry is
economically mandatory, it is politically undesirable from the perspective of
any one regulator. In other words, the reform proposals that make the most
economic sense are the ones most unpalatable to the special interest groups
controlling the political process.
B. The Economics
While it is commonplace to blame problems in the banking industry on
either rapid expansion within the industry,18 or regulatory capture that ena-
bled banks to enter new lines of business, 19 these answers fail to explain fully
the current crisis. Rapid expansion of, and entry into, the industry can ex-
plain why profits have declined over time in the financial services industry,
but they do not account for the industry's rapid rate of losing money. Eco-
nomic theory predicts only that entry and expansion will compete away mo-
nopoly profits. It does not predict that firms will expand and enter a
monopolized industry beyond the point at which normal market rates of
return can be earned; yet this is precisely what has happened in the banking
industry.
Banks are failing in record numbers because banking market forces and
technological advances have rendered commercial banking largely obsolete
and have enhanced the role of investment banking as the primary vehicle
through which capital is allocated in the economy. These market forces and
technological advances have eliminated the informational advantages once
available only to commercial banks, thus increasing the competition for as-
sets and forcing banks to take more risks in order to compete. The resulting
asymmetry between banks' assets and liabilities raises serious questions
about the continuing viability of traditional commercial banks as sound eco-
nomic entities.
Historically, banks profited because they had distinct informational ad-
vantages that enabled them to make highly informed credit decisions. Ac-
cording to the "checking account hypothesis," 20 because of their access to
exclusive information on the finances of borrowers, banks are the best
monitors of borrowers. Small and medium-sized businesses usually have
18. Bryan, pp. 67-69.
19. Garten, pp. 3-5.
20. Leonard 1. Nakamura, Commercial Bank Information: Implications for the Structure of
Banking 9 (Nov. 21-22, 1991) (paper presented at the Conference on Structural Change in Banking,
New York University, School of Law and Salomon Center, Stein School of Business) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
[Vol. 45:289
HeinOnline -- 45 Stan. L. Rev. 294 1992-1993
BANK FAILURE
their deposit accounts at the same banks at which they have lines of credit.21
By examining the checks written against a commercial customer's checking
account and the deposits into the account, a bank loan officer can determine
the size of the payroll, the salaries of the firm's key personnel, the amount of
money paid for supplies, the identity of the firm's major customers, and the
seasonal pattern of the business' receipts.22 With this information readily
available, banks obtained a significant competitive advantage over other
sorts of financial intermediaries. 23 As Alan Greenspan has observed:
The heart of financial intermediation is the ability to obtain and use infor-
mation. The high cost of gathering and using facts in the past meant that
banks and other intermediaries could profit from their cumulative store of
knowledge about borrowers by making significantly more informed credit
decisions than most other market participants. These other market partici-
pants were thus obliged to permit depository intermediaries to make credit
decisions in financial markets and therefore allow bank credit to substitute
for what would otherwise be their own direct acquisition of credit market
instruments. 24
Unfortunately for commercial banks, the advance of computer and tele-
communications technology has dramatically reduced the costs of recording,
transmitting, and processing information.25 These technological advances
have made it possible for firms in need of capital to bypass commercial banks
and go directly to the capital markets for funds. For borrowers, "[o]n-line
data bases, coupled with powerful computers and wide-ranging telecommu-
nication facilities, can now provide potential investors with virtually the
same timely credit and market information that was once available only to
the intermediaries."'26 Thus, the demand for banks' specialized skills in val-
uing assets has declined in the information age. Borrowers reduce costs by
cutting out the middleman.
In addition to the decline in demand for banks' asset valuing skills,
changing financial markets have provided alternate vehicles for raising capi-
tal and securing credit, both services once supplied primarily by bank com-
mercial lending departments. In particular, the development of secondary
and new issues markets for trading securities has made it increasingly easy
for business firms to raise capital through public offerings of securities, or
securitization.27 Other alternative financial mechanisms for raising capital
that have intruded on the services provided by banks include mortgage-
backed securities, 28 consumer receivables financing,29 consumer loan-backed
21. Id. at 14-22.
22. Id. at 14.
23. Id.
24. See Greenspan, supra note 2, at 93.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and
Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 772-73 (1991).
28. Mortgage-backed securities axe interests in a pool of mortgages packaged and sold by lend-
ing institutions to provide liquid funds and usually, to shift the default risk of the mortgages to the
purchaser of the securities.
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securities,30 and the explosive growth of the commercial paper market.3 1
Furthermore, the increasing sophistication of these secondary trading mar-
kets permits investors to rely on market forces rather than the judgments
and evaluative skills of commercial bankers.32 Therefore, as these financial
markets have developed, both "the information, evaluation and [the] trans-
action services provided by commercial banks are increasingly displaced by
newer and more efficient forms of financial intermediation. '33
But the steady decline in commercial banks' overall share of the financial
markets has not been distributed randomly over their assets. Rather, securi-
tization has removed the best assets from banks' balance sheets, resulting in
an increasingly risky commercial banking industry. The distinctive charac-
teristic of commercial banks is that they specialize in analyzing and holding
in their portfolios nonstandardized, or "information-problematic," credit
risks.34 In general, credit risks can be viewed as lying along a continuum,
with "information-problematic" borrowers at one end, and borrowers with
few information problems at the other.35 Typically, those borrowers with
few information problems will not utilize bank borrowing, but instead will
"issue traded securities (along with commercial paper and medium-term
notes)."'36 But information-problematic borrowers either will be denied ac-
cess to the capital markets by lenders who are unwilling to extend credit to
borrowers about whom they have insufficient information, or else they will
obtain capital from commercial banks, S & Ls, and other depository institu-
tions that specialize in lending money to borrowers with information
problems.
All else being equal, it is more expensive to obtain credit from commer-
cial banks than capital markets. Banks, which hold loans in their portfolios,
have carrying costs and monitoring costs that other financial intermediaries
do not have; these other financial intermediaries keep substantial blocks of
risky assets off of their balance sheets. And, as the quality of the nation's
securities markets has improved, and as technological advances have driven
down information costs, assets once considered information-problematic and
29. Companies package and sell interests in their short-term, consumer notes to obtain lower
interest rates than those that would be available if the loans were based on the company's entire
balance sheet
30. Consumer loan-backed securities are identical in form to mortgage-backed securities. The
difference is that banks pool automobile and credit card loans.
31. "Commercial paper" is the trade name for short-term (less than nine months) promissory
notes that financial and industrial corporations issue to raise capital. See Jonathan R. Macey, Note,
A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the Glass-Steagall Act, 91 YALE L.J. 102, 104 (1981).
32. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 773; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rnv.
1059 (1990) (explaining that investors can rely on efficient securities markets to price securities).
33. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 774.
34. ROBERT E. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKs Do? 14 (1987).
35. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Impact of Securitization on the Bank Liquidity
Problem 6 (Nov. 21-22, 1991) (paper presented at the Conference On Structural Change in Banking,
New York University, School of Law and Salomon Center, Stein School of Business) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
36. Id.
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not securitizable (like credit card receivables and home mortgages) are now
being securitized and sold. Thus, banks that once had a portfolio of assets
ranging from the extremely risky to the extremely safe are seeing the safer
assets stripped out of their balance sheets to be traded in the securities mar-
kets. Only those assets that cannot be securitized because of information
problems remain.
In sum, market developments and technological advances have left
American banks with a simple choice: shrink or become riskier. As we have
stated elsewhere:
As assets that are more easily sus[c]eptible to monitoring are stripped out of
banks' assets and securitized, banks are faced with the following choice:
they can either shrink by declining to replace securitized assets with new
assets, or else they can... make loans to borrowers with more severe infor-
mation problems than previously had been made.37
Not only has the business of banking become riskier, the fundamental
economic justification for banking, as traditionally conceived, has evapo-
rated over time. According to the traditional conception of banking, com-
bining deposit-taking with commercial lending allowed commercial bankers
to obtain important information by monitoring deposit accounts and enabled
them to reduce the risks associated with their lending activities. But, for
several reasons, changing market forces lead us to question whether combin-
ing these two activities into a single entity is still justified. First, it is becom-
ing more rare for borrowers, particularly large borrowers, to concentrate
their deposit activities and borrowing with a single bank.38 This tendency
has, in turn, reduced the information advantages to banks of combining
these two activities. In addition, the disadvantages of combining lending
and deposit-taking have worsened due to the asymmetry between the term-
structure of banks' assets and the term-structure of their liabilities. Banks'
assets come in the form of long-term and highly illiquid loans, while their
liabilities come in the form of short-term, highly liquid deposits. As noted
above, the process of stripping away and securitizing of liquid, less problem-
atic assets has made the asset side of banks' balance sheets increasingly illiq-
uid. 39 By contrast, the emergence of deposit brokers and the development of
electronic funds transfer technologies have enabled depositors to shift their
deposit funds among competing banks virtually instantaneously, leaving the
liquid assets on the liability side of banks' balance sheets and increasing the
asymmetry.
The combination of these changes raises doubts about the continuing
economic viability of commercial banks. While there will always be a need
for lending and for deposit-taking, the question is: Whether it continues to
37. Jonathan R. Macey, Securitization: Its Effect on the Future of Banking 6 (Nov. 21-22,
1991) (paper presented at the Conference On Structural Change in Banking, New York University,
School of Law and Salomon Center, Stein School of Business) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Stanford Law Review).
38. Nakamura, supra note 20, at 3, 15.
39. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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make economic sense to combine these two functions in a single entity. In
light of (1) the diminishing role played by deposit accounts as a source of
information for bank loan officers; (2) the recent trends in securitization,
which reduce the liquidity of banks' assets; and (3) the increased mobility of
deposits, which increases the liquidity of banks' liabilities, it seems doubtful
that banks can remain viable economic entities in their own right.
Instead, it appears that banks remain viable only because federally subsi-
dized deposit insurance enables them to attract operating funds (in the form
of deposits) at below-market rates. If market forces alone controlled the
evolution of the financial services industry, we believe the traditional lending
activities conducted by banks and funded by demand deposits would instead
be conducted by equity-based nonbanking institutions. By funding personal
and commercial lending with equity rather than debt in the form of insured
deposits, the asymmetry between the term-structure of banks' debt and
banks' equity would be eliminated. Shareholders' equity claims could be
freely sold in the secondary markets, but as these claims would be nonre-
deemable, they would not impair banks' liquidity. Moreover, the diversifica-
tion available to equity investors would enable them to cope better with the
increasing riskiness associated with banks' lending activities in the current
era of securitization.
Similarly, financial institutions that specialized in attracting and main-
taining demand deposit accounts could design their portfolios to match their
liabilities by purchasing highly liquid short-term assets. In sum, it is the
artifact of deposit insurance that makes it possible for commercial banks to
mismatch the maturity structure of their assets and their liabilities. Absent
deposit insurance, "rational depositors would prefer to place their deposits
at banks that matched the maturity structure of bank assets with those of
bank liabilities." 40
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Any proposal to reform the banking industry must appreciate both the
political and economic underpinnings of the current crisis. The need for
reform is self-evident. But it is not enough simply to assert that regulatory
reform is needed. Some recognition must be made of the fact that
"[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. ' 41 Any reform pro-
posal must also deal with the perverse political incentives-either by adjust-
ing the incentives of regulators, or else by reducing the role of government
regulation and increasing the role of market forces in designing solutions to
the endemic problems of the banking industry. The irreversible economic
forces and the increasing efficiency of the securities markets have rendered
our traditional commercial banking system obsolete.
Unfortunately, the authors of the current wave of books on the banking
crisis fail to understand that the traditional role of banks as financial in-
40. Macey, supra note 12, at 1281.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 19 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
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termediaries combining commercial lending and deposit-taking is obsolete.
They also fail to appreciate that accomplishing meaningful reform of the
bank regulatory system will require more than reiterating the painfully obvi-
ous observation that there is something dreadfully wrong with the current
system.
A. Lowell Bryan's Common-Sense Approach
Bankrupt: Restoring the Health and Profitability of Our Banking System
is the best of the current crop of books about the banking crisis written for
popular audiences. Lowell L. Bryan, a consultant with McKinsey & Com-
pany, has written highly accessible, yet sophisticated, descriptions of both
the origins of the modem banking industry and of its current status as ward
of the regulatory state. Unfortunately, Bryan fails to link these two sets of
descriptions and does not connect fundamental market forces that have al-
tered the business of banking with the need for reform. Moreover, the im-
pact of Bryan's considerable knowledge about banking is diminished by his
political naYvet6 and his poor understanding of the economics of financial
markets.
To his credit, Bryan recognizes that "[o]ur current approach to regulat-
ing banks is bankrupt." 42 He also recognizes that consolidation in the bank-
ing industry is an important part of any solution to the problems of the
banking industry.43 In his view, consolidation resulting in "[a] more com-
pact industry of large, robust banks will be able to compete in the global
marketplace for financial services." 44 But Bryan fails to understand that
economic forces mean that banks do not need to consolidate simply to be-
come bigger and to compete more effectively in world markets. Rather,
banks must consolidate because there has been a decline in the economy's
need for the services that banks provide. Therefore, any consolidation that
takes place in the banking industry should be accompanied by shrinkage in
the industry.45 The operation of the economic forces described in the pre-
ceding section makes it inevitable that the banking industry will shrink.
A second weakness in Bryan's discussion is his failure to recognize the
basic problem of asymmetry in the liquidity of bank assets and liabilities.
Bryan embraces the idea of core banking, which he defines as banking that
serves "the needs of individuals, small business borrowers, and mid-size
companies." 46 Bryan's notion of core banking would permit banks to con-
42. Bryan, p. 207.
43. Bryan, pp. 198-99.
44. Bryan, p. 207.
45. Because shrinkage of the banking industry is inevitable, one relevant question is whether
the shrinkage in the industry will continue to manifest itself in the form of bank failures (which harm
the economy and impose enormous hardship on taxpayers), or in the form of mergers and hostile
takeovers (which are low-cost substitutes for bank insolvencies). See generally Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1153 (1988) (discussing the problems arising from bank failures and suggesting that procedural
reforms making acquisition of banks more feasible would serve valuable monitoring functions).
46. Bryan, p. 213.
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tinue both to make illiquid commercial loans, as well as to take deposits.47
Thus, his proposal does nothing to eliminate the basic asymmetry problem
that lies at the root of the current bank failure embroglio. Indeed, Bryan
recognizes that his core bank proposal would have limited effect on banks'
balance sheets; in fact, over 90 percent of the current non-money center bank
loans are to borrowers who would be eligible to borrow from banks under
his core bank proposal.48 A better, more useful conception of core banking
would restrict banks' activities in order to reduce the asymmetry between
bank assets and bank liabilities to mitigate the problems.49
Another weakness in Bryan's presentation is his failure to understand the
fact that banks compete with other financial institutions. Bryan believes that
setting terms and conditions on bank lending would be a good idea. Fur-
thermore, since all core banks would face the same restrictions, these restric-
tions would not place banks at a competitive disadvantage in the financial
markets.50 Unfortunately, this suggestion ignores the fact that banks com-
pete with mortgage companies, finance companies, investment banks, manu-
facturers who lend money through subsidiaries, and retailers who offer
credit cards. By making banks less competitive than other financial institu-
tions, restrictions on bank lending would make banking more, rather than
less, risky.
By contrast, a true narrow bank would entirely decouple lending and
deposit-taking and eliminate the traditional justification for deposit insur-
ance. Depositors' money would be backed by short-term, highly liquid
money market instruments. Depositors who want absolute assurance that
they will be able to recover the full value of the funds they have placed on
deposit can place their funds in institutions that invest only in short-term
U.S. government securities.
Bryan finished his book in February, 1991, at a time when meaningful
reform seemed possible:
Fortunately, President Bush, the Treasury department, the Federal Re-
serve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and many members of
Congress are well aware that the problems in the banking industry need to
be addressed now, and that a new answer is needed....
As this book was being completed .... the Treasury proposed a set of
structural reforms that are headed in the right direction. These proposals
provide a good first step.51
Given the current political situation and inactivity in this public policy area,
it is apparent that Bryan was overly optimistic.
Thus, while Bryan thoroughly understands the need for fundamental re-
form in the banking industry, he fails to mention that political reality is
likely to make such reform impossible. For example, at one point, Bryan
47. Bryan, pp. 213-18.
48. Bryan, p. 215.
49. LrrAN, supra note 34, at 6.
50. Bryan, p. 217.
51. Bryan, pp. 6-7.
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provides a succinct account of the way bureaucrats and politicians conspired
to understate the severity of the savings and loan crisis.52 At a time when
several bank experts (including Bryan) were estimating that economic losses
in the S & L industry were climbing to the $100 billion level, a modest $15
billion recapitalization bill for the S & L industry was derailed after massive
lobbying by the U.S. Savings League, a trade association for the industry.
5 3
On the surface it is certainly paradoxical that the thrift industry trade
association wanted to derail a bailout of its own industry. After all, it seems
intuitive that lobbyists representing an industry on the verge of collapse
would pull out all the stops to qualify for bailout status. Closer scrutiny,
however, reveals that the existence of federally sponsored deposit insurance
accounts for the seemingly inconsistent lobbying tactics of the thrift indus-
try. In most industries, when a firm is tottering on the brink of insolvency, it
has a difficult time attracting new credit. But in the banking industry, the
suppliers of capital are depositors-who are federally-insured and thus in-
different to the financial health of the banks to which they extend credit by
means of new deposits. Because deposit insurance was already in place, the
savings and loan industry did not need a formal, federal bailout. From its
standpoint, it had a more attractive alternative: a "homemade" bailout.
For banks, a homemade bailout is simple to do. Management of an in-
solvent S & L simply offers a sufficiently high rate of interest on demand
deposits to attract enough new capital to keep operating. Insolvent financial
intermediaries can keep doing this for a very long time. The scheme ends
only when regulators finally close the bank, or there is literally not enough
money in the bank's vault to pay depositors. Ultimately, the thrift industry's
plan for a homemade bailout exponentially raised thrift losses caused by
bank failures by artificially keeping "dead" thrifts alive too long.
Why would regulators permit the S & L industry to engage in these
homemade bailouts? The answer lies in regulators' preoccupation with
short-term results. From the regulators' perspective, the advantage of a
homemade bailout is that it delays the inevitable disbursement of govern-
ment funds. Bank regulators do not benefit from employing strategies that
reduce the ultimate costs to taxpayers. Instead, regulators benefit by reduc-
ing the disbursements of government funds occurring while they are in
office.
Congress and the public seem to gauge the severity of the banking crisis
by peculiar measures. The following criteria are particularly important: (1)
the dollar amount of the FDIC's disbursements each year; (2) the number of
banks that have been declared insolvent each year; and (3) whether private
investors who have purchased insolvent banks have succeeded in making a
profit. The public appears to think that banking regulators perform better in
years in which they spend less money rescuing failed banks. But this method
of evaluating regulatory performance only leads to a bureaucratic strategy
52. Bryan, p. 73.
53. Bryan, p. 73.
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that delays the recognition of the banking industry's losses, making the ulti-
mate resolution of the problem far more costly.
Similarly, a regulatory agency's decision to recognize a particular bank
as insolvent is highly subjective. Bank regulators have strong incentives to
postpone the recognition that a financial institution is insolvent in order to
create the false impression that the regulatory process is somehow improving
or solving the bank failure problem. This delay has the effect of exacerbating
losses over time. In addition to these perverse incentives, the high turnover
among bank bureaucrats, particularly mid-level bureaucrats, heightens the
short-term focus. By delaying the disbursements and closings of failed
banks, these regulators can force their successors to take the blame for their
recalcitrance. 54 Finally, the public, fueled by extravagant press accounts,
presumes that the government somehow has been ripped off whenever pri-
vate investors who invest in failed banks succeed in making a profit. This
perception has been fueled by the publicity surrounding the transactions en-
gineered by M. Danny Wall, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS). 55 Wall approved dozens of bailouts providing millions of dollars in
tax incentives and government guarantees to private investors in the form of
yield maintenance agreements and repurchase guarantees.5 6
B. Barth, Brumbaugh, and Litan's Economic Approach
By far the best book on the banking crisis to date is The Future ofAmeri-
can Banking by Barth, Brumbaugh, and Litan.57 The book provides a frank
and dire assessment of the economic status of the nation's banking system.
The authors explain how the FDIC's accounting practices lead to wildly
optimistic estimates of the financial condition of the nation's banks.58 They
also painstakingly demonstrate how the banking industry's financial condi-
tion has continued to deteriorate over time.59
Interestingly, the authors produce data showing that the healthiest banks
are the nation's smallest banks.60 This finding supports the arguments made
in this essay about the effects of securitization and the declining role of bank
monitoring.61 Unlike large banks, small banks typically specialize in making
small loans, which cannot easily be securitized. Thus, the balance sheets of
smaller banks have not deteriorated in quality the way the balance sheets of
larger banks have; the best assets of these smaller banks simply cannot be
54. See Jonathan R. Macey, It's Time for Bush to Pay the Piper on the S & L Bailout, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, at M4.
55. See, eg., Stephen Labaton, Favoritism Found in Savings Cases, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 13, 1990,
at Al.
56. See Sherrill, supra note 5, at 610-12.
57. This book had its genesis in 1990, when its authors were commissioned by the House
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance to analyze the cur-
rent and prospective condition of the commercial and savings banks insured by the FDIC's Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF).
58. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, p. 28.
59. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, p. 41.
60. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, p. 44.
61. See text accompanying notes 19-40 supra.
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stripped out and securitized because of their size. In addition, the small
borrowers that comprise the clienteles of these small banks are more likely to
maintain checking accounts with the same institutions from which they bor-
row. Consequently, the traditional argument that checking accounts serve
as a valuable source of information for lenders continues to apply to small
banks.62
Among the more eye-opening observations the authors make is that Cit-
icorp, the nation's largest bank, probably is insolvent because its tangible
capital is less than its liabilities.63 Using a variety of accounting techniques
and market-based measures of financial stability, the authors successfully
show the "counterfeit nature of reported capital" and prove that the real
condition of the nation's banks is far worse than had been thought.64
In addition, the authors document the effects that securitization has had
on the profitability of banks' traditional lending operations:
Powerful advances in computer technology significantly improved informa-
tion processing and helped develop new kinds of financial assets that began
to erode the role of banks in lending. Probably most important, technologi-
cal advances helped launch the securitization of finance, that is, the packag-
ing of individual loans or other assets into bundles sold in the market in
various forms of securities.
... Simply put, securitization has been one way in which technological
development has been eliminating the need, or demand, for depositories.
... By turning formerly illiquid depository assets into liquid securities
that can be held by many firms and individuals, securitization has been un-
dermining the traditional depository function and therefore its return on
capital.65
They also show how bank profitability is being eroded by increased com-
petition in the various types of firms seeking consumer deposits. Money
market funds, credit unions, and other forms of depository institutions all
compete with banks for the right to handle (for a fee) the funds of people
wanting safe, short-term receptacles for their cash.66
Thus, while most of their observations are not new, the real contribution
of the Barth et aL book is its demonstration that the dim condition of many
of the nation's banks is even worse than is currently believed. To deal with
this situation the authors propose an increase in bank capital, improvements
in financial reporting, earlier regulatory intervention, private reinsurance,
nationwide banking, and a lenient merger policy. Each of these suggestions
is worthy of consideration. None of them are new, and none deal with the
fundamental reality that, at its core, the banking problem is as much a polit-
62. See Nakamura, supra note 20, at 14-15.
63. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, pp. 74-75.
64. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, p. 77.
65. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, pp. 84-86.
66. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, p. 107.
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ical problem as an economic problem. Despite the theoretical merit of these
observations, none are likely to make a difference unless regulatory and bu-
reaucratic incentives can be changed dramatically.
For example, the authors consider early intervention, which requires reg-
ulators to close banks whose capital-to-asset ratios decline below a certain
level, to be the most important of their policy prescriptions. On its face, the
merit of this suggestion is clear. If a financial institution can be closed and
liquidated at the precise moment that it becomes insolvent-when its assets
just equal its liabilities added to the costs of liquidation-then insolvency
costs to the FDIC and the taxpayer are zero. Unfortunately, the reality of
the banking business makes early closure an unreasonable regulatory option.
This is because banks' assets traditionally are kept in highly illiquid assets
that are, by definition, extremely difficult to value. Consequently, if regula-
tors were to close banks when the market value of their assets equalled the
market value of their (highly liquid) liabilities, then they would have to close
virtually all of the nation's banks, since banks' assets typically have very
little immediate market value.
Similarly, the authors' proposal for early intervention ignores the fact
that such early intervention is unlikely to save the FDIC or taxpayers much
money unless the agency changes its strategy for resolving insolvent financial
institutions. Currently, regulators at both the OTS and the FDIC strongly
prefer failure resolution strategies that merge insolvent financial institutions
with other financial institutions to strategies that simply liquidate the un-
healthy institutions.67 Indeed, despite the statutory requirement, which stip-
ulates that the FDIC must employ the most cost-effective resolution
strategy,68 the FDIC has shown a proclivity to bail-out insolvent banks with
cash infusions rather than liquidate such banks when suitable merger part-
ners are unavailable.6 9
Unless the FDIC and the OTS somehow gain courage and liquidate
more insolvent banks, the authors' early resolution strategy will achieve little
in the way of savings for the FDIC. Moreover, regulators' current prefer-
ence for mergers and bailouts does nothing to achieve the much needed
banking consolidation discussed at length by Barth et a170
C. Books Which Fail to Describe the Problem or Propound Useful
Solutions
Unfortunately, the books by James Pierce and Helen Garten do not meet
the high standards set by Barth et al. and by Bryan in their comprehensive
accounts of the banking problem. The solutions proposed by Pierce and
67. See Bill Atkinson, Hearing May Mean Life or Death for Ryan's Thrift Rescue Program,
AM. BANKER, Mar. 24, 1992, at 1.
68. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat.
2236 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.).
69. See Jonathan R. Macey, Needless Nationalization at the FDIC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1992,
at A10.
70. Barth, Brumbaugh & Litan, pp. 197-205.
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Garten reflect the naive view that more regulatory oversight is the answer to
the banking industry's problems.
1. Pierce's preliminary attempt
While Pierce discusses securitization, he fails to understand how finance-
related innovations have diminished investor's demand for the traditional
banking services. 71 Yet Pierce recognizes that fundamental changes of some
sort are affecting the industry.72 Unlike the authors of the two books al-
ready reviewed, Pierce is not particularly clear about the nature of these
changes or possible regulatory responses to them. Pierce appears to advo-
cate protecting the stability and integrity of the nation's monetary system as
a top regulatory priority.73 This proposal seems misguided, especially since
the current check-clearing and payment mechanism is one of the few areas in
banking regulation where the status quo is working well.
Despite the absence of a viable theoretical predicate for his proposal, the
substance of Pierce's idea, while unoriginal, is similarly objectionable. His
proposal differs hardly at all from the "narrow" bank scheme offered earlier
by Robert Litan and others.74 While Litan would limit investments by fed-
erally insured banks to short-term Treasury securities,7 5 Pierce would per-
mit such banks to invest in highly liquid, money market instruments.76
2. Garten's failed attempt
Professor Garten's book is a compilation of her previous law review arti-
cles on banking regulation. Like Pierce's analysis, Garten's writing lacks
sophistication about the origins of the current banking crisis, thus depriving
the book of much intellectual force by reducing it to a set of assertions about
reform. Garten's ultimate conclusion is that new regulatory strategies may
be insufficient to enable the industry to emerge from its current difficulties.
Because Garten also makes it clear that she distrusts market forces, the
reader is left with the belief that the author simply does not understand some
core issues.
Professor Garten has suggested that part of the problem with reform of
the banking industry may lie in regulatory capture. 77 Capture theory posits
that, over time, regulatory agencies become dominated and controlled by the
industries they regulate. 78 Unlike more sophisticated theories of regulation,
capture theory singles out a particular interest group-like commercial
71. Pierce, pp. 83-84.
72. Pierce, pp. 127-28.
73. Pierce, p. 136.
74. Pierce, p. 138.
75. LrrAN, supra note 34, at 165.
76. Pierce, p. 137.
77. Garten, pp. 4-8.
78. See MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BusINEss By INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 3-
4 (1955); HARMAN ZIEGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SocIETY 119-20 (1964); see also
Avery Leiserson, Interest Groups in Administration, in ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
314, 314-16 (Fritz Morstein Marx ed., 1946).
BANK FAIL URE
HeinOnline -- 45 Stan. L. Rev. 305 1992-1993
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
banks-that systematically prevails in the struggle to influence the regula-
tory process, and "predicts a regular sequence, in which the original pur-
poses of a regulatory program are later thwarted through the efforts of the
interest group."' 79 Garten has argued that deregulation in banking can be
explained by the fact that "[w]ell-organized groups (such as bankers) with a
substantial stake in the outcome will determine the production of
regulation." 80
Yet Garten ultimately rejects capture theory as an explanation for the
regulatory process because she does not find it useful. 81 In particular, she
apparently does not understand why regulatory grants of broad new powers
to banks are typically accompanied by the imposition of restrictions that
place banks at a disadvantage in their attempts to compete against other
financial intermediaries such as insurance companies, investment banks, and
brokerage firms.
Professor Garten's analysis fails to recognize the economic theory that
she is attempting to apply to the banking problem. Capture theory has not
survived as a convincing theory of regulation.8 2 The theory is useless in
most contexts, because it "has no predictive or explanatory power at all
when a single agency regulates separate industries having conflicting inter-
ests."'83 Capture theory may be a promising theory for explaining the behav-
ior of regulatory agencies like the Comptroller of the Currency, that have
regulatory responsibility over a single industry. But the theory breaks down
in the context of agencies, like the Federal Reserve Board, which have regu-
latory responsibility over a number of different competing industries. These
multi-industry agencies will respond to the political pressures exerted by
their various constituencies by fashioning compromises designed to maxi-
mize the political support received by the agency from all the industries it
regulates.84
Thus, a more sophisticated "political support maximization model"
would predict that single-industry regulatory agencies like the Comptroller
will generally produce regulations that favor banks. But in the case of multi-
industry agencies like the Federal Reserve, the theory predicts that the
agency will tend to produce regulations consisting of political compromises
that reflect both the relative political strength and the intensity of prefer-
ences of all of the competing interests it regulates.85
This type of political compromise can be found in the Federal Reserve
regulations allowing banks to compete against securities firms, but only on
terms and conditions that leave them at a distinct competitive disadvantage.
79. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. ScL. 335,
342 (1974).
80. Garten, pp. 4-5.
81. Garten, pp. 5-6.
82. See, e-g., Macey, supra note 12, at 1284; Posner, supra note 79, at 342.
83. Posner, supra note 79, at 342.
84. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Adminis-
trative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIATION 93 (1992).
85. Macey, supra note 12, at 1284-85.
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Perhaps the most striking example of this tendency is the Fed's decision to
permit bank holding company affiliates to underwrite and deal in commer-
cial paper and other securities, but to limit their involvement in such activi-
ties to at most a 5 percent share of the total market for that activity.86 The
limitation on market share was designed to prevent banks from taking too
much of the securities markets away from the investment banks and securi-
ties firms that comprise an important part of the Fed's natural
constituency.87
Thus, although Professor Garten is correct in her observation that the
regulatory process produces odd results, she is absolutely wrong in her asser-
tion that economic theories of regulation "are of limited use in explaining
the curious way in which deregulation is actually occurring in banking.18 8
Consistent with the political support maximization model, single-interest
group regulatory agencies generate results that reflect the preferences of
their lone constituencies, while multi-interest group agencies generate the
sorts of compromises described above.
IV. CONCLUSION
As might be expected, there is great variety in the quality of books writ-
ten about the banking crisis. The Barth et aL and the Bryan books are the
most impressive of the lot. They understand and attempt to deal with the
systemic problems facing the banking industry. Their substantive proposals
for restructuring the banking industry also make sense.
86. William W. Wiles, Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 73
FED. RESERVE BULL. 473 (1987).
87. See National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 1975). In National Courier, the D.C. Circuit upheld a Federal Reserve Board determina-
tion that permitted bank holding companies and their affiliates to enter the document courier busi-
ness, but limited the sorts of materials these companies could transport, putting the companies at a
competitive disadvantage. Id. at 1240-41. The holding companies and their affiliates could trans-
port their own internal documents, as well as commercial papers such as checks and negotiable
instruments exchanged among banks and banking institutions, but were not permitted to transport
documents and papers deemed not to be of a commercial nature. Id.
Similarly, Fed limitations regarding the data processing services bank holding companies can
offer reflect a propensity on the part of the Fed to balance the demands by banks and bank holding
companies that they be allowed to expand their operations into new and more profitable areas
against the demands by other industries that they be protected from the competitive effects of such
expansion. See Association of Data Processing Servs. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The problem with the compromise reached by the Fed was that it ignored the significant econo-
mies of scale in many areas of the securities business, particularly in the commercial paper segment
of that industry. As a consequence of these economies of scale, firms must do a substantial volume
of business---and capture a substantial market share--or else they cannot earn a competitive rate of
return. Thus, the Fed's market share limitation, which was intended as a simple political compro-
mise, had the practical effect of severely reducing the ability of banking organizations to compete
with securities firms in these new lines of business.
Moreover, there was no basis in law for imposing a market share limitation on the activities of
banks' affiliates. Ultimately, the Fed's determination was overturned by the Second Circuit, despite
the deference normally given to determinations of administrative agencies. Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1059
(1988).
88. Garten, p. 5.
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In the Pierce, Bryan, and Barth et aL books, the reader is left with the
clear impression that the banking crisis could be solved if only regulators,
Congress, and the executive branch could muster the political will to over-
come the combination of bureaucratic inertia and interest-group intransi-
gence that has blocked fundamental reform efforts to date. While the
approaches of these three authors differ, any of the various proposals would
be a marked improvement over the current system.
The authors have a diverse range of economic perspectives. For exam-
ple, Brumbaugh is a Chicago-school economist, while his co-author Litan,
an economist at the Brookings Institution, is closer to Lester Thurow in his
intellectual orientation. Pierce and Bryan are middle-of-the-road social en-
gineers without particularly strong ideological leanings. But these authors
have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus about how the banking sys-
tem ought to be reformed. Given the severity of the banking crisis and this
general consensus about reform strategy among policy experts, one might
think that meaningful reforms would be quickly implemented. But this has
not been the case.
Since 1980, five pieces of so-called major banking legislation have been
enacted.89 Nevertheless, none of them has instituted meaningful reform.
The only conclusion that one can draw from this incredible history is that
the problems facing the banking industry are political, not economic. The
investment banking and insurance industries do not want banks to intrude
on their turf and are willing to lobby relentlessly to insure that they do not.
Banking regulators realize that if the banking industry declines in impor-
tance, as it should, they will become less relevant as policymakers. Thus, the
bureaucratic instincts of self-preservation cause them to align themselves
with those forces opposing meaningful reform.
But, while the forces resisting change are powerful and well organized,
the forces in favor of change are either politically damaged or so widely
disbursed as to render them ineffective. Many commercial banks and S & Ls
recognize the need for change. But, similar to the 1930s, the banking indus-
try has been blamed for the current crisis and is politically weak. Expanded
powers that would enable banks to diversify their activities beyond the tradi-
tional areas of lending and deposit-taking continue to be perceived as impos-
ing even more risk on the deposit insurance system. While expanded powers
would impose more risk on the deposit insurance system, such risks could be
eliminated. Bank risk would fall if their insured deposit-taking activities
were isolated within the confines of a narrow bank. Unfortunately, taxpay-
89. The Deposit Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); the Gan-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); the Competitive Equality Banking Act
of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 15
U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered volumes and sections of the U.S. Code); and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105
Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.).
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ers generally resist calls to curtail the reach of deposit insurance, because
they see such reforms as imposing significant risks without concomitant ben-
efits. The general public also views calls for narrow banks with suspicion,
since the limited earning powers of such banks would reduce investor re-
turns in demand deposit accounts.
What should be clear from reading the books written by Barth et aL and
Bryan is that the problems facing the banking industry are capable of satis-
factory resolution. No impervious technological or structural barriers stand
in the way. Rather, in our view, the implicit message in both of these books
is that numerous economic solutions are available. Unfortunately, bureau-
cratic intransigence, congressional corruption, and executive neglect all have
combined to deprive the American public of much needed banking reform.
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